We analyze an algebraic representation of AES-128 as an embedding in BES, due to Murphy and Robshaw. We present two systems of equations S and K concerning encryption and key generation processes. After some simple but rather cumbersome substitutions, we should obtain two new systems C1 and C2. C1 has 16 very dense equations of degree up to 255 in each of its 16 variables. With a single pair (p, c), with p a cleartext and c its encryption, its roots give all possible keys that should encrypt p to c. C2 may be defined using 11 or more pairs (p, c), and has 16 times as many equations in 176 variables. K and most of S is invariant for all key choices.
Introduction
Rijndael is a block cipher, that encrypts blocks of 128, 192, and 256 bits using symmetric keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits. It was designed with a particular attention to bit-level attacks, such as linear and differential cryptanalysis. Its resistance to such attacks is the dichotomy between operations in F = GF (2 8 ) and GF (2). Since its proposal, many new bit-level attacks, such as impossible differential and truncated differential have been proposed. Most of them break with some efficiency reduced versions of Rijndael, but they are not much better than exhaustive key search in the general case. In practice they are mainly academic arguments rather than real world threats to the security of AES. The interested reader can find an account and some references about these cryptological tools in [ODR] .
1.
The AES-128 cipher
The AES encryption algorithm is sketched below:
Input a cleartext x.
-Initialize State = x.
-perform an operation AddRoundKey, in which RoundKey is xor-ed with the State.
For nine (first to ninth) rounds:
-perform a substitution operation called SubBytes on State, using an S-box. -perform a permutation ShiftRows on State.
-perform an operation MixColumns on State.
-perform AddRoundKey.
The tenth (last) round:
-perform SubBytes.
-perform ShiftRows.
Define the ciphertext y to be the State.
All AES operations are byte-oriented. The cleartext, ciphertext, and each output of intermediate steps of encryption and decryption algorithms are thought of as 4 × 4 matrices of bytes. The operations on each
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(c) 2004 IFIP s00 s01 s02 s03 s10 s11 s12 s13 s20 s21 s22 s23 s30 s31 s32 s33 =⇒ s00 s01 s02 s03 s11 s12 s13 s10 s22 s23 s20 s21 s33 s30 s31 s32 Figure 1 . The ShiftRows operation on AES byte are those of the finite field F = GF (2 8 ). The elements are thought of as polynomials with coefficients in GF (2), mod (m(t)), the so-called Rijndael polynomial :
They are represented as integers pairs in hexadecimal representation. If interpreted as eight-bit binary strings, we have the t−term exponents.
The SubBytes operation substitutes each of the bytes x with S(x):
Actually, S(x) is a permutation polynomial. The ShiftRows operation permutes bytes in each row, see Figure 1 .
The MixColumns operation performs a permutation of bytes in each column using a matrix in GL(F, 4), introduced later in Section 2.1. In practice, the columns are considered as polynomials in F[x], and multiplied mod (x 4 + 1) by the polynomial a(x) :
Now consider the key schedule. The key used in every cipher round is successively obtained by the key of the precedent one. Here is the complete procedure.
Input a key h 0 . Initialize H 0 = h 0 .
For each round r = 1, . . . , 10, permute (RotWord) the sub-vector formed by the last four elements (word) of H r−1 , see Figure 2 .
Perform the SubWord (S-box on each byte) operation on the obtained result, and add the vector Rcon r = (t r−1 , 0, 0, 0).
Define the other elements by means of bitwise xor operations in terms of the obtained result and other words from H r−1 .
Define the set of keys to be h to be {H r | r = 0, . . . , 10}. Consider each vector as a four-words set, indicated with a second index ranging from 0 to 3 indicating single parts. For y ∈ F 4 we put ϕ r A (y) = SubWord(RotWord'(y)) + Rcon r . The r th round for AES key generation scheme is:
The BES cipher
We start from the BES cipher, in which AES is embedded by a "natural" mapping. BES operations involve only computations in F. This permits to describe AES using polynomial equation systems. Solving them means to find the key or an alias, and therefore to break the code.
The state spaces of AES and BES are respectively A = F 16 and B = F 128 . The basic tool for embedding is the conjugation φ, taking for each value in F eight successive square powers.
It is easily verified that (with 0 −1 = 0)
and we define B A = φ(A) ⊂ B as the subset of B corresponding to A. Let p, c ∈ B be the plaintext and ciphertext, respectively; w i , x i ∈ B (0 ≤ i ≤ 9) the state vectors before and after the inversion phases, and h i ∈ B the used keys.
Correspondence
The matrix L A : F GF (2) 8 → GF (2) 8 F for the one-byte affine transformation in the S-box phase can be represented by the polynomial function f : F → F:
. The successive squares of f are needed, and the answer is given by a simple induction with basic step
The resulting matrix, still indicated with L B , is
The global transformation Lin B : F 128 → F 128 is the block diagonal matrix with 16 blocks equal to L B .
The AES S-box constant c A = 63 = t 6 + t 5 + t + 1 ∈ F goes into:
The corresponding BES vector c B is obtained using sufficient copies
The AES ShiftRows may be represented by R A : 
"Expanding" each 1 in R A with an identity matrix of order 8, I 8 , and each 0 with a zero (8 × 8) matrix, we have R B : F 128 → F 128 .
The AES MixColumns may be represented by C A : F 4 → F 4 :
The AES transformation is given by the Mix A : F 16 → F 16 block diagonal matrix having as blocks four copies of C A . In order to obtain the corresponding matrix we first need to compute C (k) B , for k = 0, . . . , 7:
where t 2 0 = t t 2 3 = t 4 + t 3 + t + 1 t 2 6 = t 6 + t 3 + t 2 + 1 t 2 1 = t 2 t 2 4 = t 6 + t 4 + t 3 + t 2 + t t 2 7 = t 7 + t 6 + t 5 + t 4 + t 3 + t t 2 2 = t 4 t 2 5 = t 7 + t 6 + t 5 + t 2 (16) from which (t + 1) 2 k = t 2 k + 1 are immediately obtained.
In an appropriate basis, the resulting matrix M B : F 128 → F 128 is a block diagonal one, with four consecutive copies of C (k) B for all possible k. The change of basis is necessary because of the different positioning of value powers in φ's image with respect to our needs. Indeed, if a ∈ F 16 , then:
φ(a) = (a 0 , ..., a 
This transformation is given by a permutation matrix Perm B : F 128 → F 128 . To represent it easily, suppose to divide it into (16 × 8) submatrices P hk , h = 0, . . . , 7, k = 0, . . . , 15. Each sub-matrix element (with i = 0, . . . , 15, j = 0, . . . , 7) is: 
For the last round, being Mix B absent, we have
but in this particular case we have
, and for what concerns this, we can avoid to distinguish the last round from the precedent ones. The change for key generation scheme is simply the addition of a constant vector to each obtained round key, and this will be the form of the system we will work with. Now we analyze the BES translation for the key generation scheme.
The AES RotWord operation is represented by RW A : F 4 → F 4 . 
RW
For the BES version RW B : F 32 −→ F 32 , replace the 1's with I 8 , and 0's with the (8 × 8) zero matrix.
The S-box is here applied only to a part of the whole vector, and therefore the matrix dimension changes. The resulting block diagonal matrix Lin k B : F 32 −→ F 32 has four blocks equal to L B . The constant c k B is given by just four copies of φ(c A ):
The constant vectors Rcon i = (t i−1 , 0, 0, 0) are mapped into:
We keep using the matrix notation, but here in a functional sense. We have here to use constants. If ϕ i B : F 32 → F 32 is the BES i th -round mapping function for a conjugated word x: 
Polynomial Systems
We show how encryption and key generation can be represented by algebraic systems. All variables satisfy the F-belonging equation y 256 + y = 0.
Encryption
Remembering that the last round differs slightly from the other ones, with M * B = R B · Lin B , the system for codification is [MR] : 
Let S , = 1, . . . , 6 be the equations in the th line of the system for all values of i, j and m, and I the ideal they generate. As we see, the system is very sparse, with S = {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 } linear, and the other equations in
Block Number of variables k 11 · 16 · 8 = 1408 x 10 · 16 · 8 = 1280 w 10 · 16 · 8 = 1280 Total = 3968
Key Generation
There is an analogous system for key generation. The equations express all the h i,(j,m) variables in term of the h 0,(j,m) ones. The index ranges for the equations are: i = 1, . . . , 10,, = 0, . . . , 3 and m, m = 0, . . . , 7, and γ are the Lin k B matrix coefficients.
Let cR i = c k B + (Rcon B ) i be the vector in each round, and its components δ i . Thanks to the third equivalence of (21), with t = 0, . . . , 15 and the conjugation property, we have:
Resolution
We are interested in obtaining the key out of the systems S and K, that is the original key h = φ −1 (k ) = {h 0 , . . . , h 15 }, where k = {k 0,(0,m) , . . . , k 0,(15,m) }.
In order to obtain relations among h (k) components we eliminate all other variables. We do this: modifying the way the systems are presented, doing some "hand" substitutions, and finally performing Gröbner bases computations (more complicated substitutions, expansions and simplifications) to obtain the final systems.
Note that, for each variable v ∈ k, w, z, h, the conjugation property may be synthesized by the obvious following relations:
Encryption
We rewrite S: first of all, we remove the imposed restriction about inversion, substituting S 4 with an equation expressing the true definition of the general inversion in F. Then we use (33), to remove all the 
With the last equation we can remove all the x i,(j,0) , and, being each line a set of successive square powers, we keep only the ones with m = 0:
We note that the β coefficients do not depend on j and j , and the values are simply the coefficients of f . To simplify notations even more, we take, mod 255: 254, 253, 251, 247, 239, 223, 191, 127 ) , ω = (ω i ) = (ω 0 −127, . . . , ω 7 −127) = (127, 126, 124, 120, 112, 96, 64, 0) We can now avoid writing m index:
The system has 16+9·16+16 = 176 equations in 11·16+10·16 = 336 variables. Obviously, it expresses nothing but a series of successive substitutions, down to the last equation. Considering a block lexicographic (lex) order for which
we have a (not reduced) Gröbner basis [CLO] , and the substitutions may be considered as the complete reduction computation. The resulting set of the last 16 equations, where all the w variables are no more present, is what we are looking for. If q S j are the resulting polynomials, we have:
Key Generation
We get more informations analyzing K. We substitute z variables in the second line equations. use the conjugation property, note that C B (c B ) has c A = t 6 + t 5 + t + 1 in the (j, 0) positions, and opportune powers in the other ones. This means that the equations on the fourth line of K, K 4 , may be reduced (the other ones being powers of it) to:
for the above considerations, express everything directly in term of k variables. observe that Lin k B is a block diagonal matrix, and therefore just  = is "active" for each single equation, and what remains is nothing more than the set of coefficients of the f polynomial. 
